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International Policing in Russia: Police
Co-operation Between the European
Union Member States and the Russian
Federation
Ludo Block
In this article, contemporary practices of police co-operation between the (Member States
of the) European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) are considered. Starting
with a depiction of EU-RF police co-operation through Interpol and Europol, the article
continues with specific attention to the role of police liaison officers and the daily practice
of operational police co-operation on behalf of the EU Member States. Relevant Russian
law enforcement agencies are discussed, as well as obstacles to co-operation.
Concurrently, two EU policy instruments possibly of influence on EU-RF police co-
operation are closely examined. Findings indicate that EU-RF police co-operation is
predominantly bilateral in nature without any incentive for change. Interpol plays an
important role in this field, while as yet Europol does not. Furthermore, the impression
emerges that in daily practice EU policy instruments show insufficient understanding of
police reality, and are of little relevance to EU-RF police co-operation.
Keywords: International police co-operation; Interpol; Europol; Liaison officer; European
Union; Russian Federation
Introduction
Although increasing academic attention is given to international police co-operation,
little research is carried out on how operational police co-operation actually operates
(Fijnaut, 2004). Notwithstanding available significant research in this area (e.g.,
Deflem, 2002; Den Boer, 2002; Nadelmann, 1993; Santiago, 2000; Sheptycki, 2002),
the picture of operational police co-operation is far from complete, and lacks both
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overview and insight. In this article, the practices involved in international co-
operation between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) are
considered.1
There are two reasons that make studying the particular EU-RF area of
international police co-operation relevant. First, the RF is the biggest single
neighbour of the EU, and therefore an important partner in issues of economy
and security. The ‘‘Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation’’ between the EU and
the RF2 establishes the institutional framework for EU-RF relations, and consists of a
specific Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) section. Moreover, as Fijnaut (2004) notes,
compared to other third countries, JHA co-operation plays an important role in the
overall policy of the EU towards the RF. Second, during the 1990s, Russian organised
crime was perceived as an emerging threat to Western security (Williams, 1997),
giving a considerable impetus to police co-operation between the EU Member States
and the RF. The contemporary practices of international police co-operation that
have resulted, will be described in this article, with the primary aim of expanding the
empirical knowledge of this subject.
The article begins by reviewing the nature of co-operation between the EU
Member States and the RF through the International Criminal Police Organisation
(Interpol) and the European Police Office (Europol). Following this, attention is
given to direct bilateral co-operation, while focusing predominantly on the role and
tasks of the law enforcement liaison officers stationed by various EU Member States
in the RF. The sections thereafter will address the Russian law enforcement agencies
that actively engage in international co-operation, as well as the obstacles to co-
operating with those agencies. Then the article outlines the existence and
implications of EU policy instruments relevant for operational police co-operation
in this specific area. Finally, some concluding remarks are made.
Framework
Koers (2001) distinguishes a tripartite distinction in forms of international police co-
operation; technical assistance; prevention and upholding public order; and criminal
investigations. Providing technical assistance varies from offering information and
training on police practices and techniques, to the actual donation of equipment or
direct financial aid. It is often seen as a first step towards future co-operation in other
fields, as during this co-operation personal networks and trust, both indispensable for
close co-operation, can be built up.3 Co-operation in upholding public order will
most often be seen between neighbouring countries in regional cross-border policing
and when events, such as football tournaments, have instant cross-border effects. The
most established, and referred to form of international police co-operation is the
co-operation in the field of criminal investigations, entailing exchange of police






































































In addition to different forms of co-operation, different levels of co-operation can
also be identified in relation to police co-operation. Benyon et al. (1993) distinguish
three inter-related levels, a macro-, meso- and micro-level of international police co-
operation. The macro-level applies to constitutional and international legal arrange-
ments and initiatives and*particularly within the EU*the harmonisation of
national laws and regulations. This is the governmental level at which fundamental
issues, such as procedures for extradition and assistance in criminal matters, are
resolved. Co-operative arrangements on this level are usually treaties and conventions
with judicial impact, and are often subject to parliamentary ratification. The
Schengen agreement of 1990 is an example of police co-operation at this level.
The meso-level is concerned with the structural and procedural frameworks in
which operational policing occurs. The arrangements on this level are supposed to
directly facilitate operational police co-operation and do not need intergovernmental
agreements and parliamentary ratification. Although co-operation on this level
sometimes occurs as a result of political initiatives, more regularly it takes place
between different law enforcement organisations, sometimes without the knowledge
or sanction of governments (Benyon, 1997: 108). An important feature of meso-level
co-operation is periodic communication, such as working groups that include face-
to-face contact between middle-ranking officers from different countries. Also,
setting up information systems, common databases, and co-ordination of and access
to information, such as criminal intelligence, are important factors on the meso-level.
The micro-level involves the co-operation in the investigation of specific offences
and the prevention and control of particular forms of crime, in other words, day-to-
day operational police co-operation. This can occur on an ad-hoc basis, though,
especially in the EU, co-operation on this level is increasingly based on existing
macro- and meso-level arrangements, like the Schengen Agreement and co-operation
through Europol. In direct bilateral co-operation of this kind, the use of liaison
officers, who are posted from one country to work with their counterparts in another
country, is frequently seen as an effective instrument (Bigo, 2000).
Between all three levels, a symbiotic relationship often exists and therefore,
although this article will predominantly focus on micro-level co-operation, macro-
and meso-level aspects of co-operation between the EU Member States and the RF
will also be discussed.
Interpol
The International Criminal Police Organisation, which is the formal name of
Interpol, is the oldest structure facilitating international police co-operation in the
world. Originally formed in 1923 and given its present name in 1956, the
organisation has steadily grown in membership, but has never substantially changed
in form or objectives (Deflem, 2002). Interpol is, in fact, a non-governmental
organisation based on the self-organisation of police forces around the world without
any direct government influence.4 Operating as a global channel for peer-to-peer




































































police communication, in 2004 Interpol had a total of 182 participating member
countries that in total sent over 6.7 million messages to each other that year.5 Every
participating country maintains a so-called National Central Bureau Interpol (NCB),
staffed with its own law enforcement personnel, from where communication through
the Interpol channels takes place. These NCBs form the gateways between the
national law enforcement forces and the Interpol communication channel. The core
business of Interpol, facilitating information exchange on a case-by-case basis, is
usually characterised as police co-operation at the micro-level (Benyon, 1997). In the
last few years, Interpol has, however, increasingly developed its other functions, i.e.,
providing a range of criminal databases*currently a total of seven global police
databases can be searched directly from each NCB*and analytical services, as well as
proactive support for police operations throughout the world. These indicate a
further expansion of Interpol’s activities into meso-level police co-operation, of
which its regional and functional conferences and working groups are already known
examples.
Interpol not only has its origin in Europe,6 but also is at present still of high
importance for police co-operation in Europe. The European region of Interpol,7
which consist of 46 States and includes the EU Member States as well as the RF,
accounts for 64 per cent of the message traffic passing through the organisation each
year.8 The ‘‘Interpol channel’’ as such is mentioned in various treaties of the Council
of Europe and in the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the Member States of the European Union (OJ C197 12-07-2000) as an official
channel for sending requests, especially in cases of urgency.9 A co-operation
agreement between Interpol and Europol was signed in 2001, Interpol is regularly
represented at the Heads of Europol National Units meetings,10 and, moreover, the
EU supported Interpol in 2003 to upgrade facilities at NCBs in five Balkan countries.
These examples show the significance that the Council of Europe, the EU and their
Member States attribute to Interpol. Therefore, even though the organisation has
primarily a global mission, without doubt Interpol plays a crucial role in police co-
operation in the EU and the European region on the micro-level, and increasingly on
the meso-level as well. Consequently, Interpol’s importance in police co-operation
between EU Member States and the RF is beyond question.
Police co-operation with the RF through Interpol channels is nonetheless a rather
recent phenomenon, as the police of the former Soviet Union did not take part in
Interpol. In April 1990, almost at the end of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Council of
Ministers agreed on applying for membership of Interpol, which was granted at the
59th General Assembly of Interpol in Ottawa in September 1990. In January 1991, the
NCB Moscow started to operate, first as NCB of the Soviet Union, but after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991, as the NCB of the largest
succession state, the RF (Ovchinskiy, 2000).
This arrangement lasted until 1996 when membership by the RF of Interpol was
formalised in the RF by a Presidential decree and elaborated in a government





































































Moscow were determined.11 The NCB Moscow is formally a part of the staff
apparatus of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation (MVD). Its tasks are
‘‘to provide effective international information exchange on criminal acts’’, ‘‘to render
assistance in executing requests of international law enforcement organisations and
law enforcement organs of foreign countries’’ and ‘‘observation of the execution of
international agreements on matters regarding combating crime, in which the RF is a
participant’’. This entails more than being a ‘‘gateway’’ for information, and is
elaborated in the defined functions for the NCB Moscow that include:
. receiving, handling and sending to the General Secretariat of Interpol and to
foreign NCBs, requests, investigative instructions and other messages of law
enforcement and other government organs of the Russian Federation;
. taking measures for the timely and necessary execution of requests of law
enforcement and other government organs of the Russian Federation;
. arranging the execution on the territory of the Russian Federation of requests
received from foreign NCBs and sending these to the competent law enforcement
or other government organs of the Russian Federation;
. supervising the execution of foreign requests.12
The NCB Moscow is located in the building of the MVD Information Centre in the
southwest of Moscow, and has a staff of approximately 60 police officers. In contrast
to most EU Member States, where the NCB staff consists mainly of administrative
personnel, they have police ranks, full police powers and are allowed to carry
firearms. The NCB Moscow handles between 35,000 and 40,000 messages yearly in
approximately 4,000 different cases,13 of which the great majority (7080 per cent)
concern the European region of Interpol.
Apart from the databases filled with information from Interpol messages and cases
that have passed through their office in the last decade, the NCB Moscow does not
maintain any other independent databases. Most of the information needed to
answer foreign requests should be received from the central police departments in
Moscow or from one of the eighty-nine regional police departments throughout
Russia. Through the internal MVD electronic network, the NCB has access to some
central police databases (such as issued passport numbers and criminal records) and
is linked to the Moscow police force network (Ovchinskiy, 2000). In order to obtain
information from the regional police departments, the NCB Moscow maintains
seventy subordinated regional field offices throughout the RF.14 These field offices
collect the requested information in the region and send it to Moscow. Although
every field office is supposed to be connected to the RF-wide MVD network with an
email facility (Ovchinskiy, 2000), until recently the information exchange between
most field offices and the NCB Moscow was conducted by surface mail, often causing
long response times.
In sum, the NCB Moscow performs a key role in EU-RF police co-operation at the
micro-level. It is the gateway for foreign law enforcement agencies seeking
information from the RF, and is largely occupied with European cases. As we will




































































see later, the NCB Moscow also plays a significant part in direct bilateral police co-
operation in combating organised crime between the EU Member States and the RF.
Europol
‘‘Why do we need Europol if we already have Interpol?’’ This remark, made by a
Russian MVD general in 1999 while in Moscow at a presentation to mark the start of
Europol, shows the attitude toward Europol in the RF at that time.15 Four years later
in Rome, a strategic agreement between Europol and the RF was signed.16
Europol, established in its current form in 1999, is the European Union law
enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence, but does not have
executive powers. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and co-operation between
the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating serious
international organised crime.17 Europol facilitates the exchange of information and
intelligence between the EU Member States through the Europol Liaison Officers,
which are seconded by the Member States as representatives of their national law
enforcement agencies. They exchange information while sometimes literally sitting
together in one room in the Europol building in The Hague.
In addition, Europol generates strategic reports (e.g., threat assessments) and crime
analysis on the basis of information and intelligence supplied by Member States or
gathered from other sources. Furthermore, it provides operational analysis, technical
support and expertise on request from the Member States, although its main function
remains that of a ‘‘clearing house for information’’ (Fijnaut, 2004: 250).
Europol is only allowed to exchange personal data with third parties, i.e., non-EU
Member States, if an agreement regulating this has been reached with that third
party.18 In 2000, the Council of the European Union authorised the director of
Europol to enter negotiations with third parties for such agreements,19 and since then
seven strategic agreements and twelve operational agreements with third parties were
concluded.20 The Europol press-briefing on the agreement between Europol and the
RF stated:
The new agreement permits Law Enforcement Authorities of the Russian
Federation and Europol to exchange strategic and technical information of mutual
interest in combating serious forms of organized crime such as drugs trafficking,
illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, money laundering and terrorism.
In a second step the agreement shall be extended to include operational and
investigation related cooperation.21
This agreement, in which a strategic framework has been laid (with the possibility
to facilitate operational data exchange in the future), can be regarded as a first step in
police co-operation between the EU*as a whole*and the RF at a macro-level of
police co-operation.
For the moment, however, the importance of this agreement for operational police





































































does not provide any provision for the exchange of operational data, so actual
operational police co-operation between Europol and the RF is not yet possible.
Second, as a former superpower, the RF acknowledges the political relevance of such
agreements, whilst the observance of this agreement appears to have less priority.
More than a year after concluding the agreement, no designated central contact point
for Europol has been appointed.22
Meanwhile, some serious obstacles for effective operational co-operation exist on
both sides. In the EU, the supply of information from national police agencies to
Europol, and its role in police co-operation is still regarded as insufficient.23
Moreover, the frequent political turmoil surrounding Europol (recently regarding the
fulfilment of the director’s position24), does not contribute to building a reputation
as an effective and trustworthy partner. The Russian side seems to be aware of these
difficulties,25 however has no central focal point representing all law enforcement
agencies either. Although the annex to the agreement lists five competent law
enforcement authorities in the RF, all contacts with Europol, however, seem to be
dominated by the MVD. It is unlikely that the MVD can genuinely represent the
other law enforcement agencies, as will be elaborated later in this article. In summary,
police co-operation between the EU Member States and the RF through Europol, for
the moment, is only cautiously being shaped at the macro-level, whilst active micro-
level co-operation through Europol appears to be unlikely in the near future.
Bilateral Co-operation: A Key Role for Liaison Officers
Direct bilateral contacts, sometimes referred to as ‘‘horizontal’’ police contacts, both
formal and informal, still form the backbone of police co-operation in Europe
(Benyon, 1993; Den Boer, 2002; Santiago, 2000). Informal networks of personal
contacts are often seen as crucial in this respect (Bigo, 1996; Sheptycki, 2002; van
Reenen, 1989), although it takes time to develop a level of trust adequate for co-
operation (Anderson, 2002). At the present time, such networks between the law
enforcement agencies of RF and the EU Member States to a large extent only exist
between the RF and those neighbouring EU Member States, which, possibly with the
exception of Finland, used to be part of the former East Bloc.26 Furthermore, a
considerable language barrier impedes the forming of informal networks between the
EU Member States and the RF, all together resulting, as yet, in the limited relevance of
this channel for EU-RF police co-operation.
Over the last decade, however, another channel for direct bilateral co-operation
emerged as a result of stationing EU Member States’ liaison officers in the RF. With
respect to liaison officers in Europe, Bigo (2000) argues that they are the human
interface between the various national police forces and their role is, ‘‘crucial for
policing in Europe, because it is they who manage the flow of information between
their respective agencies’’ (Bigo, 2000: 67). For bilateral police co-operation between
the EU Member States and the RF, liaison officers seem to fulfil a similar significant
role and their number has risen significantly in the last decade. Whereas in 1999 a




































































total of fifteen liaison officers, representing seven EU Member States, were stationed
in the RF, in 2004 this number has risen to thirty-one representing sixteen EU
Member States.27 At the present time, they form the majority of foreign law
enforcement representation in the RF.28
Table I shows the number of liaison officers from 1992 to 2004.29 The substantial
growth from 1998 can, in part, be attributed to EU Member States deciding to station
a first liaison, which includes those liaison officers that since the enlargement of the
EU in May 2004 are regarded as EU Member States liaisons.30 The other part of the
growth can be contributed to the increase in the number of liaison officers per
Member state, now varying from one to seven liaison officers for an individual
country. Some 75 per cent of the liaison officers are stationed in Moscow, and for
obvious reasons, Estonia, Finland and Sweden have liaison officers present in St.
Petersburg, while Norway has a liaison officer in Murmansk. Almost all liaison
officers have one or more local support staff, totalling more than fifty persons dealing
full time with law enforcement co-operation on behalf of EU Member States in the
RF.31
Daily Practice
All EU Member States’ liaison officers more or less perform the same ambiguous role,
as described by Nadelmann (1993), of both official representative on behalf of their
agency as well as that of a fixer, i.e., a facilitator of requests from and to their home
country for information, evidence, interrogations, searches, arrests and extradi-
tions.32 There is, nonetheless, considerable variation in the background, competence,
working area and exact tasks of the liaison officers in the RF. Twenty-four are police
officers, most with an operational background in investigative work, five liaison
officers have an operational customs background and two have a border guard
background. In most cases, police liaison officers deal with ‘‘police’’ requests, and
customs liaison officers deal with ‘‘customs’’ requests. When it comes to combating
Table I Total number of EU Member States’ law enforcement


















































































international drug and arms trafficking, the division is less obvious and some liaison
officers are competent in both customs and police matters.33 Regarding the working
area of the liaison officers, some only cover the RF, others cover the whole former
Soviet Union or parts of it.
The average liaison officers’ daily tasks consist mainly of information exchange
with Russian law enforcement, but also include assistance with judicial co-operation,
such as preparation and supporting the executing of commissions rogatoire, assistance
with extraditions, and non-operational technical co-operation like training and
exchange of knowledge.34 Furthermore, several liaison officers fulfil (supporting)
tasks in immigration and visa matters in their respective embassies.
The main priority of the liaison officers is dealing with requests originating from
their respective country to the RF, and some are even expected by their agency to deal
only with those and not with requests brought up by their co-operating counterparts
in Russia. At first sight, and especially from a governance perspective, such a policy is
understandable*it is after all expensive to maintain a liaison network abroad.
Then again, from an operational perspective, there are at least two solid reasons
that encourage liaison officers to deal also with requests brought up by the Russian
agencies. First and foremost is cultivating reciprocity. In practice it is not possible for
a liaison officer to bring only questions to his counterparts and never answers. To
some extent, reciprocity can be offered by providing technical assistance and sending
Russian colleagues to training courses and on other trips abroad. In the end, however,
both parties need their investigative successes, and, therefore, maintaining a
reciprocal ‘‘exchange of information’’ relation is crucial for a liaison officer. The
second reason stems from an intelligence point of view. Every request for information
inherently contains information on possible criminal activities, criminal structures
and involved persons. This could shed light on security threats in the liaison officers’
country that otherwise might have escaped the focus of the judiciary. In practice,
therefore, one will see all liaison officers to a certain extent deal with cases originating
from their own country as well as from the RF.
Commonly, the liaison officers handle those cases that, mostly because of
complexity, sensitivity or urgency, need more active support than a simple
information exchange that could pass through Interpol channels or*in case of a
customs investigation*through direct contacts between customs authorities. How-
ever, the need to maintain reciprocal relations with several actors both in the RF and
in their home country, results in less complex cases handled by the liaison officers as
well, mainly to build up ‘‘credit’’.
In total, EU Member States’ liaison officers in Moscow handle about 4000 cases a
year,35 with the actual number varying between 60 and 500 cases per Member State.
There is, as with many other concepts regarding operational police co-operation, no
shared definition of a ‘‘case’’.36 Placing too much emphasis on this number could
therefore be tricky. Nevertheless, it represents a fairly large part of the bilateral
operational workload and supports the earlier presented assumption that liaison




































































officers play a key role in the micro-level police co-operation between the EU
Member States and the RF.
On the meso-level of police co-operation, several bilateral initiatives exist, like the
Finno-Russian Border guard working group,37 and the German-Russian working
group on organised crime.38 The best known meso-level co-operation initiative, in
which several EU Member States as well as the RF participate, appears to be the
multilateral Baltic Sea Task Force on Organised crime,39 which is often mentioned as
‘‘best practice’’ in this area. The aim of the task force, which is a clear example of a
meso-level initiative, is to ‘‘strengthen the ability to prevent and combat organised
crime by setting up a close co-operation between law enforcement agencies in each
country based on existing structures’’.
Looking at the macro-level, it shows that all EU Member States with a liaison
officer posted in the RF have concluded one or more bilateral agreement(s) on law
enforcement co-operation with the authorities of the RF. These agreements differ
both in level*interagency versus intergovernmental*and in content, such as
regulating technical assistance, exchange of information, placement of liaison officers
or combinations of these. All together, a web of bilateral macro-level co-operation
arrangements exists, all expressing the intention to co-operate, but not all with the
same relevance for day-to-day operational co-operation. Multilaterally only the series
of Conventions regarding legal co-operation in criminal matters from the Council of
Europe cover several formal aspects.40 Since 1996, the RF has signed and ratified four
Conventions*and some additional protocols*of the Council of Europe concerning
legal co-operation in criminal matters. These conventions, which entered into force in
the RF between March 2000 and December 2001,41 predominantly regulate judicial
co-operation. However, in practice*partly due to differences in legal systems*both
judicial and police co-operation are often entangled to a large extent (Fijnaut, 2004)
and, therefore, these Council of Europe Conventions have relevance for the EU-RF
police co-operation.
Russian Law Enforcement Agencies
There are four law enforcement agencies in the RF that, on a regular basis, engage in
international law enforcement co-operation with their European counterparts. These
are the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the
State Customs Committee (GTK) and the State Anti Drug Committee (SADC).
Another important co-operation partner for the European law enforcement agencies
is the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO).
The police in the RF are organised in the MVD in both functional and geographical
departments. All of the eight-nine Russian regions have a Main Department of
Internal Affairs (GUVD), which can be described as a (partly) independent regional
police force with all basic police functions organised within the structure. Next to
these geographical departments, the MVD has several functional police departments





































































(GUBOP) and the Federal Service for Combating Economic and Tax Crimes
(FSENP).
The MVD does have a central international co-operation department, however,
virtually no operational co-operation takes place through this department, as it
mainly performs a role in logistic and protocol arrangements. Most regional and
functional departments have a separate international co-operation unit within their
structures. Some officers from operational units, such as the operational investigative
bureau for combating drugs inside the GUBOP and the Moscow Police Criminal
Investigations Department (MUR), have direct contacts with the EU Member States
liaison officers.
In this respect, the NCB Moscow is worth mentioning, as it also functions as an
important counterpart for the Member States’ liaison officers*next to dealing with
requests received through Interpol channels. Besides facilitating operational informa-
tion exchange, the NCB assists in contacting various departments in the MVD or
other law enforcement agencies, with receiving delegations and carrying out
extraditions. Requests made by the liaison officers normally get a high priority
within the NCB Moscow, and even though it has to get its information elsewhere, the
NCB is one of the most frequently contacted law enforcement counterparts by the EU
Member States’ liaison officers.
The FSB, heir of the illustrious KGB, has broad law enforcement functions,
including fighting (organised) crime and drug trafficking, in addition to its main
responsibilities of security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism.42 Also, the
Federal Border Guard is nowadays again,43 part of the FSB structure. Having,
contrary to most European security services, full powers of criminal investigation,
makes the FSB an important partner for the liaison officers. Their international co-
operation department handles all daily operational co-operation, normally the liaison
officers do not meet the FSB case officers, unless in long term ongoing complicated
cases or due to a specific request. Opinions about the co-operativeness of the FSB
differ. In general, it can be said that if there is a common interest for both the FSB
and a foreign partner, their co-operation is likely to be swift and professional. The
activities of the FSB are, however, subordinate to foreign policy and national security,
even when co-operating in criminal matters.
For the EU Member States’ liaison officers who are mainly occupied with customs
cases, the GTK is the most frequently contacted co-operation partner. In some
matters, there is an overlap between what could be classified as an ‘‘administrative
(customs) case’’ or a ‘‘criminal (police) case’’. This also makes the police liaison
officers often contact the GTK, commonly in cases of drug trafficking and cigarette
smuggling.
The formation of the 40,000 employees strong SADC in 2003 appears to have been
mostly of a political nature, in contrast to the official explanation that a new
organisation was needed to effectively combat drug trafficking in the RF.44 The
operational capabilities and thus the effectiveness as co-operation partner of the
SADC are still unclear for the liaison officers, though the good personal contacts of




































































several SADC international department employees result in regular interactions
between the SADC and the EU Member States’ liaison officers.
For judicial co-operation, the EU Member States’ liaison officers co-operate
frequently with the GPO through which the majority of the formal requests for legal
assistance have to pass before these can be executed. Although handling such formal
requests is normally qualified as judicial co-operation compared to police co-
operation (Koers, 2001), a large number of the EU Member States’ liaison officers are
engaged in handling these formal requests as well. Given that judicial co-operation is
often the formal follow-up of successful, operational police co-operation, this makes
perfect sense. Generally in the RF, formal requests for legal assistance should be
executed by prosecutors and investigators of the prosecution service.45 If the
execution of the request can take place without coercive means for which an order
of a prosecutor is needed,46 an investigator from one of the investigative committees
attached to the law enforcement agencies can handle the request.
This brief sketch of the Russian law enforcement agencies that frequently engage
in international co-operation with the EU Member States’ liaison officers shows that
it is difficult to point out one agency that can reasonably act as a central point
representing all Russian law enforcement agencies. Moreover, overlapping compe-
tences and fierce competition between the law enforcement agencies in the RF result
in very limited interagency co-operation and sharing of information. This is one of
the obstacles in bilateral co-operation that will be elaborated in the following section.
Obstacles to Bilateral Co-operation
Obstacles that are met by EU Member States’ liaison officers in bilateral operational
police co-operation with their RF counterparts can roughly be divided into four
categories. The first is organisational obstacles. Most often mentioned by the liaison
officers is the rampant bureaucracy (and accompanying strict hierarchy) in the law
enforcement agencies, resulting in long response times. In very urgent cases, and on
the basis of personal relationships with the right persons, swift action can take place,
although these remain an exception. Another obstacle in this category is the strong
competition that exists between the law enforcement agencies and their profound
mutual distrust, especially between the MVD and the FSB (Kaliyev, 2002). In the field
of combating drug trafficking, where all four agencies are competent, interagency co-
operation only seems to work if based on personal contacts.47 Finally in this category,
the lack of funding of the Russian law enforcement agencies can be mentioned as a
factor that obstructs swift and efficient co-operation.
The second category of obstacles for police co-operation is widespread corruption.
Corruption in Russian society has been omnipresent in the last hundred years
(Brovkin, 2003) and structural corruption inside the Russian law enforcement
agencies has been widely documented.48 Although not every Russian law enforcement





































































This severely limits the trust that can be placed by the liaison officers in their
counterparts, and, thus, hampers the co-operation.
The political dependency of law enforcement agencies as well as its political
functions, although apparently less than under the communist party of the Soviet
Union, are still present (Shelley, 1996), and cause the third set of obstacles. This
category has three commonly recognisable manifestations. First, if a new Minister or
head of a law enforcement agency is appointed, trusted partners of the new leadership
replace soon after almost all department chiefs. Although this situation became more
stable recently, it still forces the liaison officers to frequently rebuild their network on
that level. Second, law enforcement agencies are frequently used as political tools in
targeting those out of political grace.50 Not complying with a request for co-
operation in such cases from the RF, even when the so-called ‘‘criminal case’’ is clearly
politically motivated, can seriously endanger the liaison officers’ working relations,
and even affect the overall political relations between the RF and the liaison officers’
country.51 Finally, persons that are part of the ruling class or have their support
appear to enjoy relative impunity*attempts to obtain information about or
assistance in investigating these persons are futile.
The final set of obstacles concern differences in (legal) culture and language as
identified in other research as well (e.g., Den Boer, 2002; Tak, 2000). Examples are the
lack of command of foreign languages on both sides, different ways of organising and
prioritising investigations, differences in legal systems, and last but not least,
unfamiliarity on both sides with relevant differences.
EU Justice and Home Affairs Instruments in Practice
A variety of regulatory JHA instruments, e.g., action plans, decisions, acts and
recommendations, from the Council of the European Union have been released in the
last few years. Looking at the content, two of these could be directly relevant for
police co-operation between EU Member States and the RF.
The first instrument is the ‘‘European Union Action Plan on common action for
the Russian Federation on combating organised crime’’.52 This plan is ‘‘ . . . designed
to promote close co-operation between the European Union and its Member States,
and the Russian Federation in the fight against organized crime’’. It describes
preferable action in the fields of judicial co-operation, law enforcement co-operation,
and co-operation in other forums. On the subject of law enforcement co-operation,
the plan sums up seventeen possible arrangements.
Amongst others it is noted that ‘‘special attention can be devoted by the Russian
Federation law enforcement authorities to priority issues’’, ‘‘technical, operational and
strategic information and intelligence can be exchanged’’, ‘‘central Russian Federation
contact points will be identified’’, and the development of ‘‘common principles as
appropriate’’ is endorsed. Also, it is mentioned that ‘‘training courses will be held
with Russian Federation law enforcement personnel to develop good practice in the
field of international cooperation’’. Furthermore, a special paragraph is devoted to the




































































Member States’ liaison officers in the RF which lays down that ‘‘these officers
[should] meet on a regular basis’’, ‘‘exchange relevant information’’ and ‘‘should have
the opportunity to consider the implementation of the action plan and to put
forward proposals for strengthening that process’’.
Noteworthy is the absence of concrete goals, timeframes, available budgets or
defined responsible actors for the actions mentioned in the Action Plan, as well as the
careful avoidance of sensitive points in regard to inefficient organisational practices
and corruption in the RF law enforcement agencies. In practice, since 1999 the only
identifiable consistent action53 taken based upon the plan, has been the organisation
of meetings for the EU liaison officers by (almost) every presiding EU Member State.
The added value of these meetings, which habitually look like a typical Brussels’
session with pre-drafted conclusions supporting national priorities of the presiding
EU Member State, is less apparent. Since 2000, EU Member States’ liaison officers
have put forward several proposals for tangible action as recommended in the action
plan, though these are stranded in bureaucracy. In this context, the Finnish Minister
of the Interior noted that ‘‘ . . . the practical implementation of this program has
perhaps been too much based on the actions of the EU police liaison officers in
Moscow’’.54
The liaison meetings, as suggested in the action plan ‘‘to promote information
exchange’’, were in place before the action plan was drafted and have continued since.
During these bi-monthly informal meetings, several technical and strategic items are
discussed between all*and not only EU*law enforcement liaison officers posted in
Moscow. However, operational information is not exchanged during these meetings,
which is not surprising given the unlikelihood of sensitive operational information
exchange in any multilateral setting (Lefebvre, 2003). Liaison officers do sometimes
exchange operational information bilaterally en marge of the meetings, nevertheless
this has no relation with the determined goal and/or significance of these meetings.
The second EU instrument possibly of influence to EU-RF police co-operation, is
the ‘‘Council Decision on the common use of liaison officers posted in third countries
by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States’’.55 This Decision aims at
‘‘strengthening cooperation on the posting of liaison officers to third countries and
international organisations in order to combat serious forms of cross-border crime
more effectively’’ and replaces the 1996 Joint Action on the same subject.56 According
to Article 2 of the Decision, the Member States are to ensure that their liaison officers
‘‘establish and maintain direct contacts with competent authorities in the host State’’,
‘‘contribute to the collection and exchange of information which may be used to
combat serious cross-border crime’’ and ‘‘carry out their tasks within the framework
of their responsibilities and in compliance with the provisions, laid down in their
national laws and in any agreements concluded with host States or international
organisations’’. Other provisions instruct the liaison officers to ‘‘meet regularly to
exchange relevant information’’, ‘‘work together to improve relations with the host
State’’, ‘‘share tasks among themselves’’, ‘‘look after the interests of one or more other





































































States that do not have a liaison officer in a specific third country may make requests
to a Member State that does have a liaison officer there. Finally, EU Member States
are obliged to notify each other and the General Secretariat of the Council about the
posting and duties of liaison officers by them as well of the national contact points.57
Several provisions, especially those in Article 2, of this Council Decision are merely
a description of already existing practices without any obligation for the EU Member
States. Other provisions provide for sharing tasks, looking after the interests of other
member States and requesting another Member State to use its posted liaisons.
Especially as this can be perceived as a far-reaching form of co-operation, and even
may be characterised as a first step to horizontal integration, as defined by van
Reenen (1989). One could question if expecting such co-operation is realistic,
especially looking at the current situation in the EU, where the notion of sovereignty
of the Member States still strongly governs all JHA actions (Fijnaut, 2004).
Often, the Nordic police liaison co-operation is used as an example of successful
and effective sharing of liaison officers.58 However, this Nordic police co-operation
has gradually evolved informally over the last 30 years, and should be viewed against
the Nordic co-operation in general (Gammelgård, 1997). It reflects the history of the
Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland), and the fact that
these countries are closely related, not only geographically, but also culturally and
socially. This situation is an exception in the EU, since not only do the law
enforcement systems vary widely (Anderson, 2002), but their foundations, i.e.,
national cultures, do so as well (Hofstede, 1991; Sheptycki, 1999). It is, therefore, by
no means evident that such close co-operation will easily emerge between any of the
other EU Member States, if at all.
Concluding Remarks
While avoiding far reaching conclusions based on this limited research, some
concluding remarks and observations can be made. The article started with the
observation that the empirical picture of international police co-operation is still far
from complete, and subsequently has attempted to fills some gaps. In describing the
role of both Interpol and Europol in operational police co-operation between the EU
Member States and the RF, it was argued that Interpol plays an important role in this
field, while simultaneously, it became clear that, as yet, Europol does not. To support
direct bilateral co-operation EU Member States have stationed a large number of
liaison officers in the RF. These play a key role in operational co-operation, managing
a significant part of the law enforcement information flow between the EU and the
RF. The extraordinary circumstances under which the co-operation with the law
enforcement agencies in the RF takes place, make personal contacts and human
assessment crucial for achieving results. In other words, between the EU Member
States and the RF exists a stable status quo of police co-operation that can be
qualified as predominantly bilateral in nature without any significant incentives for
change at the moment.




































































EU instruments, designed to enhance and formalise police co-operation between
the EU Member States and the RF, as well as co-ordinating and formalising EU
Member States’ efforts in posting liaisons in third countries, do exist. From closer
examination of two of these EU regulatory instruments, however, the impression
emerges that both are of little relevance for police co-operation between the EU and
the RF. Obviously intended as macro-level instruments to enhance police co-
operation on the meso- and micro-level, their design shows much political ambition,
but insufficient understanding of police reality. One can wonder whether any
meaningful interaction between EU bureaucrats and police actors in the field takes
place.
If the EU has the ambition to formalise and co-ordinate the EU-RF police co-
operation, a single EU-RF legal framework for police co-operation and information
exchange, replacing the web of bilateral agreements, could be a first step to achieve
this. Nonetheless, if this were the case, the question remains to what extent such
ambition would be sensible and achievable.
The aim of this article is to contribute to our developing knowledge about
operational police co-operation. Many aspects could, of course, benefit from further
scrutiny. One question that remains to be addressed is how some core concepts
regarding operational police co-operation should be defined? Shared definitions of
these concepts could assist the structuring of empirical findings.
Future research could also focus on the increasing processes of formalisation and
institutionalisation of international police co-operation in the EU. To what extent do
the instruments of the Council of the European Union shape the reality of day-to-day
operational police co-operation in the EU and with third countries? The relevance in
researching these questions lies in the potential contribution to a better under-
standing of the dynamics of international police co-operation for practitioners and
policy-makers in the EU as well as for academics. This is important, especially since in
the contemporary debate, formalisation and institutionalisation are often seen as the
answer, not only to the increasing problem of transnational organised crime and
terrorism, but also to the fragmented law enforcement efforts in the EU.
Notes
[1] This article draws on the authors findings gathered during his work as a police liaison in
Moscow from 1999 to 2004. Information was gathered in numerous conversations with law
enforcement actors involved in the police co-operation between the EU Member States and
the Russian Federation. Facts and figures were last verified and updated in March 2005. The
author would like to thank Monica den Boer for her comments on earlier versions of this
article and all that have contributed to the research for this article.
[2] The agreement has applied provisionally since 1997 (See the Official Journal of the European
Communities (OJ) L 327, 28.11.1997) and came into force on 1 December 2000 (OJ L 283
09.11.2000).
[3] Some argue though that technical assistance can also be seen as a mechanism for a country to





































































[4] Influence is exercised though by governments through their heads of NCB which have a vote
in the General Assembly of Interpol. In practice (almost) no head of NCB votes here without
instructions from the responsible political authorities for the police in his country (i.e.,
Minister of Justice and/or Minister of Interior). The fact that Interpol is not embedded in an
intergovernmental structure has prompted criticism about its accountability, though this is a
lengthy discussion and not relevant at this point.
[5] Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2004, p. 4. (http://www.interpol.int).
[6] See Deflem (2002) pp. 124132 for the early history of Interpol.
[7] Interpol has for co-ordination purposes grouped its member countries geographically in five
regions.
[8] Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2002 and 2003.
[9] An overview of treaties and conventions in which Interpol is mentioned as a channel to send
requests and information is available online at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/
LegalMaterials/conventions/Default.asp
[10] Interpol General Secretariat Activity report 2003 pp. 1516.
[11] Presidential Ukaz Ob Uchactii Rossiyskoy Federatii v deyatelnocti Mezhdunarodnoy organi-
zatsiy ugolovnoy politsii Interpola No. 1113, 30 June 1996, and RF Governmental decree O
Natsionalnom Tsentralnom Byuro Interpola No. 1190, 14 October 1996.
[12] See RF Governmental decree O Natsionalnom Tsentralnom Byuro Interpola No. 1190, 14
October 1996.
[13] Total number of messages and cases as well as the percentage of ‘‘European cases’’ are based
both on several conversations with officials from the NCB Moscow in the last years, and on
extrapolation of recent data mentioned in a press release (Sotrudniki Interpola v Rossii v etom
godu podgotovili i osushestvili 15 ekstraditsiy iz-za rubezha b Rossiyu. RIA Novosti, 14
September 2004).
[14] Interview with Colonel Timur A. Lakhonin, Head of the NCB Moscow in Parlamentskoy
Gazete (10 June 2004).
[15] From field notes by the author made during this meeting.
[16] http://www.europol.eu.int/legal/agreements/Agreements/16191.pdf
[17] See fact sheet on Europol January 2004, available online at: http://www.europol.eu.int.
[18] Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules concerning the receipt of information by
Europol from third parties (OJ 1999/C26/03) and Council Act of 12 March 1999 adopting
the rules governing the transmission of personal data by Europol to third States and third
bodies (OJ 1999 C88/01).
[19] Council decision of 27 March 2000, OJ 2000 C106/01.
[20] Europol annual report 2003, p. 18.
[21] Europol press release 6 November 2003, available on the Europol website at: http://
www.europol.europa.eu.
[22] Most probably this contact point will be situated within the NCB Interpol (see MVD press
briefing during the European Regional Interpol conference on 3 June 2004, available online
at: http://www.mvd.ru). There are, however, some indications of a turf-war on this subject
inside the MVD. Meanwhile, it seems that Europol for communication with the MVD (other
than at Ministerial level) only possesses a telephone and fax number, not exactly knowing
where these lead.
[23] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations
(COM (2004) 4002, 2 June 2004).
[24] See, for instance, Choice of Europol chief ends year-long wrangle, Financial Times, 24
February 2005.
[25] Interview with the head of the MVD international cooperation department, Boris Shtokolov
published in Rossiskoy Gazete (22 January 2004).




































































[26] For example, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
[27] Represented Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and
the UK. Denmark is represented in Moscow by the Nordic liaisons of Finland, Norway and
Sweden, although on a daily basis the Norwegian liaison functions as the first point of
contact for the Danish.
[28] Non-EU Member States that have liaison officers stationed in the RF are Bulgaria (1),
Canada (1), Israel (1), Japan (2), South Korea (1), Ukraine (1), US (6). In addition, there are
10 representatives from CIS countries incorporated in a co-ordination bureau inside the
MVD, making a total of 23 non-EU foreign law enforcement representatives.
[29] This table was compiled based on the information provided by the liaison officers that
responded on a questionnaire held at the end of 2004. Total response was 74% (23 out of 31
liaisons responded). The actual numbers were cross-checked against open sources and
authors personal observations since 1999. Regarding the exact numbers in the years 1997 and
2002, an inaccuracy could occur because of some missing data.
[30] The four new Member States that have a liaison officer in the RF (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary and Poland) however had their liaison officer already present for several years.
[31] In comparison, the MVD has four liaison officers posted in EU Member States: Germany,
Spain, Poland and Finland. (Interview with the head of the MVD International cooperation
department, Boris Shtokolov in Rossiskoy Gazete 22 January 2004). The FSB (Russian
Security Service) has liaisons posted in Germany and Sweden. Some of the declared Russian
intelligence officers of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) posted in the EU Member
States incidentally handle requests in criminal cases on behalf of the FSB, however, this does
not seem to be substantial.
[32] For a more extensive, and perhaps more European view on the daily work of liaison
officers*that, however, does not differ much from the descriptions Nadelmann offers*see
Bigo (1996), who discusses the rise of liaison officers in Europe since the 1970s.
[33] An obvious example are the UK HM Customs & Excise Fiscal, Crime and Drug liaison
officers that cover a broad range of law enforcement issues. See on this subject NCIS
International division Annual report 20002001.
[34] An interesting development can be seen in the task of the police attachés of the French
Service de Coopération Technique International de Police (SCTIP), a department that, since its
establishment in 1961, has been exclusively focused on technical police co-operation. This
focus has shifted in the last decade because of ‘‘réalités du moment ou aux impératifs de
sécurité’’, and the activities of the SCTIP attachés nowadays include the exchange of
information ‘‘dans un certain nombre de secteurs prioritaires pour la sécurité intérieure tels
que le terrorisme, le trafic de drogue, l’immigration irrégulière, la criminalité organisée’’.
Available online at: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/rubriques/c/c3_police_nationale/c3310_
sctip/index_html (retrieved 30 December 2004).
[35] This number is based on results of the questionnaire. The responding liaison officers (74%)
together reported handling a total of 3,170 cases yearly, resulting in an average of 138 cases
per liaison officer.
[36] Most liaison officers are, for governance and accountability purposes, obliged to administer
every new inquiry handled as a separate case. A simple case could entail nothing more than a
simple one-time information exchange, and all activities in this case could take less then one
hour’s work. A complex case could entail requests for (co-ordination of) dozens of
investigative actions, followed by formal legal assistance requests. Such cases involve
hundreds of messages and take numerous hours of work spread over several months,
however, it still counts as one ‘‘case’’. To avoid paperwork, sometimes small inquiries are not





































































[37] Council of Europe (2003) Best Practice Survey No. 5: Cross border cooperation in the
combating of organised crime, p. 11.
[38] See MVD Journal Shchit I Mech (16 October 2003, no. 41, p. 1).
[39] Members are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,
Poland, Russia and Sweden. See http://www.balticseataskforce.dk.
[40] Reference is made here only to police co-operation, co-operation by customs and border
guards is based on other bilateral and multilateral agreements.
[41] These are: European Convention on extradition (1957); European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959); European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism (1977); and European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confisca-
tion of the proceeds from Crime (1990).
[42] See Federalniy Zakon Ob Organakh Federalnoy Sluzhbi Bezopaznosti, 3 April 1995, No. 40-FZ,
last changed 1 December 1999.
[43] The border guard has always been part of the former KGB, but was an independent agency
between 1994 and 2003.
[44] See Block, L. De Noordelijke zijderoute; aanpak van drugshandel in de Russische Federatie [The
Northern Silk route: combating drug trade in the Russian Federation]. Recherche magazine,
October 2003.
[45] Russian criminal law makes a distinction between the operational and the formal
investigative process, the latter strictly regulated by the Criminal Process Code and
consisting of the formal evidence collection and formation of the case-file for the
prosecution. The formal investigation is handled by so-called investigators which can be
found either at the prosecution service or at the so called ‘‘investigative committees’’,
attached to either MVD, FSB or the SADC. Since executing a request for legal assistance
mostly entails evidence collection, these should be handled formally as well.
[46] There are some more criteria that determine the exact division in competence between the
prosecution service and the investigative committees, however explaining these goes beyond
the scope of this article.
[47] See Block, L. De Noordelijke zijderoute; aanpak van drugshandel in de Russische Federatie [The
Northern Silk route: combating drug trade in the Russian Federation]. Recherche magazine,
October 2003.
[48] For more insight in corruption in the law enforcement structures in the RF, see Shelley
(1996), Vaksberg (1991) and Varese (2001). Recent and factual data in English can be found
in numerous in-depth reports in The Moscow Times.
[49] Some say that every police officer in the RF is corrupt and that only the degree to which
differs. See Battlefield view of the war on drugs. The Moscow Times, 5 March 2005.
[50] Widely known recent examples of this practice are the investigations against Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and Yuliya Tymoshenko. It should be noted that the criminal cases against the
targets could very well be solid, however the timing and the arbitrariness of launching the
cases*which have often been prepared for years until they came of use*is certainly
politically motivated.
[51] Consider for instance the case of Zakayev who’s extradition to the RF was denied by both
Denmark (2002) and the UK (2003), and specifically see the consecutive harsh comments
made on these cases by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF (published online at:
www.mid.ru).
[52] OJ C 106/5 of 13 April 2000.
[53] The action plan has been mentioned on several occasions as supporting the argument for
JHA projects in the framework of the TACIS and FALCONE programmes, although this
hardly qualifies as ‘‘action’’. See the TACIS National Indicative Program for Russia 20042006
adopted by the European Commission on 21 May 2003, and the Report on the activity of the
Falcone Programme, financial year 2000, European Commission, 15 February 2001.




































































[54] Speech of the Minister of the Interior, Finland, Ville Itälä during a seminar at the Centre of
Strategic Research, Moscow, 24 January 2002.
[55] 2003/170/JHA of 27 February 2003 (OJ L 67 of 12 March 2003).
[56] 96/602/JHA of 14 October 1996 (OJ L 268 of 19 October 1996).
[57] The Council General Secretariat possesses an overview of most Member States’ national
contact points for law enforcement liaison officers (listed in the Police Handbook 15732/04
ENFOPOL 119) but could not provide the author with an overview of Member States liaison
officers in third countries, claiming that this list does exist, however, it is not a public
document.
[58] See, for instance: EU Schengen catalogue, volume 4, Police Co-operation: Recommendations
and Best Practices, p. 16 (Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, June 2003).
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